Recognizing India as an ally of the United States

Since August 29, tensions have reappeared on the Sino-Indian border. Indian special forces illegally crossed the line on the south bank of Pangong Lake and near the Rechin Mountain Pass, and carried out “blatant provocations” against China, seriously undermining the peace and stability of the Sino-Indian border area. The Indian Ministry of Defense even proudly declared that it was “preemptive.” India’s adventurous, “rebellious and treachery” approach has met with firm opposition from China.

While India is provoking and showing its strength on the border, it is also substantially advancing strategic cooperation with the United States and its allies. According to Indian media, the “2+2 meeting” between the Indian and US Foreign Ministers and the Defense Minister will be held in September, when India will approve the signing of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) with the United States. Together with the “Logistics Exchange Memorandum Agreement” (LE-MOA) signed by India and the United States in August 2016 and the “Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement” (COMCASA) signed by the two parties in September 2018, India has signed the United States and The three basic military cooperation agreements that all defense partners need to sign have realized the sharing of military bases, communications systems, and intelligence between the Indian and US militaries, and it can be said that they have become a “true” military ally of the United States.

At the same time, there is the “Indo-Pacific strategy” that India and US allies are pushing forward. On June 4, 2020, India and Australia signed the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA), allowing Indian and Australian warships and aircraft to use each other’s military bases. Coupled with the “Mutual Provision of Materials and Services Agreement” to be signed between India and Japan, a defense system with shared military bases and logistical support has been established among the four countries of the United States, Japan, India and Australia.

However, even though India has become an ally of the United States in military defense, Indian officials have always denied the “identity” of this ally on the surface, and even insisted on strategic autonomy. India’s policy is to want the “benefit” of the US allies, but not any “name.” Because if you accept the status of an “ally” of the United States and become a “little brother” of the United States, it is somewhat a “dwarfing” of India’s self-proclaimed status as a great power. In addition, India has to consider and weigh its relationship with traditional strategic partners such as Russia and Iran. But the fact is that if a country that shares military bases, communications systems, and intelligence with the United States still believes that it is pursuing strategic autonomy, such an understanding will inevitably sound funny.

It is obvious that China cannot prevent India from becoming an ally of the United States. This is because India’s diplomatic strategy has always been highly opportunistic, not “non-alignment” and “strategic autonomy” as it claims. At the same time that it is militarily “aligning” with the United States and its allies, India has actually begun to “decouple” economically from China, in order to reshape the foreign economic network, and accelerate the rise of India through the intensified strategic competition between China and the United States. . After the outbreak of the new crown epidemic, the United States actively promoted the “de-Sinicization” of the global industrial chain, while India contributed to it, with the purpose of seizing the opportunity for the United States to promote the departure of manufacturing from China. For this reason, India has long conducted national security reviews of “Chinese Investment” and blocked apps related to China.

Therefore, after examining the reality, we now need to re-understand India, which also means that we may have to consider reassessing and adjusting India’s policy. In the past, China’s foreign policy in South Asia was largely concerned with India’s sensitivity. Now, if India’s China policy undergoes major changes, we must respond as soon as possible. Similarly, if India takes extraordinary measures on Tibet-related, Xinjiang-related, and Taiwan-related issues, we have the same reason to take reciprocal countermeasures. After all, there are far more ethnic, religious, and human rights issues in India than in China. .

On the other hand, China’s diplomacy with India does not need to adopt a position of “drawing a line with the United States,” even though India is already a military ally of the United States. The reason is that friends can choose, but neighbors cannot choose. The two large countries with a population of one billion people, China and India, must get along for generations no matter what the circumstances.