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The United States squeezes the surplus value of the “trans-Atlantic partner”

Recently, the United States has stepped up its efforts to “do work” with its European allies, and its goal of “assembling the team and facing China together” is also very clear. Following U.S. National Security Adviser O’Brien lobbying around Europe, Secretary of State Pompeo visited Britain and Denmark from 20 to 22 this month. Obviously, this is to use pressure on the United Kingdom to restrict Huawei’s success for a while, and to “take advantage of the victory” to open up the rift between China and Europe. The U.S.’s strategy for Europe has shifted from “mainly fighting” to “mainly pulling”. It wants to use political calls, security coercion, and the suspension of economic and trade wars in exchange for the “cooperation” of its European allies and further squeeze the remaining “transatlantic partners”. value.

Political consensus?

In various occasions of interaction between Europe and the United States recently, “Western democracy” has suddenly become a hot word. After more than three years of quarrels, the two sides of the Atlantic seem to have suddenly found political “common ground.” In his recent appearance in Europe, Pompeo changed his voice after enumerating China’s “crimes”, saying that Europe is also facing China’s “threat”, and then called on “trans-Atlantic partners” to jointly respond to “Chinese challenges.”

Under the “emphasis” of the United States, some people in Europe also felt that their worth had doubled and began to follow their own interests. When there were Americans, they opened their mouths about “Western” and closed their “value”, and they seemed to have forgotten how they have been in the past two years. Living through the struggle with President Trump. Downplaying and shifting conflicts, regaining the “political consensus” and playing the banner of the “Western camp” are the first axes for the United States to squeeze the surplus value of its “transatlantic partners.”

The beginning of political exchanges between Europe and the United States is the result of the United States taking advantage of the new crown epidemic and other issues to create conflicts between China and Europe. It is also a product of possible changes in European-American relations after Europe’s vision of the US presidential election. The United States blamed China for its incompetence in the fight against the epidemic, and then elevated the Sino-US competition to a “Chinese-Western struggle” and sold this idea everywhere in Europe. The U.S. strategy and narrative changes towards Europe have to some extent awakened some conservatives in Europe’s “fear and hostility” towards “non-Western”; Trump’s exhaustion and Biden’s bullish election sentiment also encouraged some Europeans to a certain extent. The pro-American faction’s confidence in the “revisiting the dream of mandarin dreams” of European-American relations under the Democratic Party. Although these two thoughts are different, they interact, highlighting the seemingly lively scene of the current “political consensus” between Europe and the United States on China.

Is security difficult to decouple?

At a time when the outside world is concerned that Europe and the United States are renewed due to the anti-epidemic, and the G7 summit may be aborted due to the European “resistance”, NATO, as the main tool for the United States to control European security, is quietly acting. Transport support has also developed a “2035 strategy” with the goal of strengthening “political attributes” and responding to “China-Russia challenges.”

Unlike NATO’s “low-key operation”, the US’s “redeployment” of US troops in Germany and “sanctions to the end” on the European-Russian “Beixi-2” natural gas pipeline project is a big fanfare, while “repairing political mutual trust” with Europe. It also reminded Germany to “don’t forget its roots” and “don’t surrender to the enemy”. At the same time, it can also use American soldiers to reward those European countries that closely follow itself. In Europe, different targets and in various fields take turns to play the “safety card”. the meaning of. Politically “pull” and “strike” on security is a perfect embodiment of the simultaneous use of the United States in pulling and attacking Europe. It also reflects the current situation that Europe and the United States are difficult to decouple in security and that Europe’s “strategic autonomy” lacks confidence.

“Holding their lives” is the US’s second axe to deal with Europe. Of course, the tactics are more complicated, that is, kidnapping Europe for European security and using Europe for international security. Under the political banner of “Common to China”, the United States is trying to gather Europe to form a “joint fleet” to cause trouble in the South China Sea. This is really attractive to some European countries that either want to use hot spots or want to brush their presence. For European countries that are still inseparable from the United States in terms of security, being used outside by the United States may be able to exchange some sense of security at home.

Is the economy hard to leave?

Some time ago, the European and American disputes over the digital taxation of aviation taxes have stopped, revealing some intentions to make way for politics. It also shows the close degree of interdependence of the European and American economies: staying at the level of mutual taxation.

Making trouble is still within the controllable range. Once it reaches the level of changing the direction of trade and changing the investment structure, Europe and the United States will not be able to bear the cost of separation.

Starting from Trump’s preferences and strategies, the close economic ties between Europe and the United States are the biggest reliance and the most effective means to implement the United States’ “pull policy” towards Europe. Because it is difficult for Europe to give up its huge interests in the US market and its deep dependence on American technology, the “long-arm jurisdiction” of the United States abusing economic means can be effective again and again, and European countries have repeatedly retreated and swallowed their voices in the face of unilateralism.

The United States is aware of China’s huge economic attractiveness to Europe, and it has to break its “dependence” on the Chinese economy in order to pull Europe past. To achieve this goal, in addition to the two axes of “politicization and security,” the third approach used by the United States is self-injury + sanctions + flicker. This is in forming a “united front” against Huawei. The performance is vivid and vivid: most European countries rely on Huawei’s leading technology and high cost-effectiveness. The United States cannot come up with alternative solutions and cannot convince Europe. It simply drives Huawei out of its own market as a “model” for self-harm, and then pulls it together. “Evidence” of security threats and threats of “Using Huawei, you can’t use madeinUSA” as a threat, forcing European countries to choose between China and the United States. In the end, they are afraid that these countries will wake up too early and draw a picture of European and American joint research and development. , Replace and surpass Huawei’s pie. The four-pronged approach has really made some countries that have been blinded by “political security”, subdued by “America First”, and dazzled by their hunger.

The relationship between the European and American allies is indeed undergoing a huge transformation. Politically, it is more self-reliant, security is more self-reliant, economically more self-reliant, and diplomacy is more compromised, but the United States will still rely on it. Strength and take turns to use the “three axes” to fight European lesbians. Europe will inevitably vacillate on its China policy, which will become the new normal of trilateral relations in international changes. We must have the confidence, wisdom and ability to navigate this complex situation.

India’s richest man and chairman of Reliance Industries Group, Mukesh Ambani recently announced that its RelianceJio company has designed and developed a complete 5G system, completely built by India, and will be deployed on the ground in 2021.

Earlier on July 6, VimSmart, the company of Vietnam’s richest man, Fan Riwang, released a self-developed 5G mobile phone. At the beginning of the year, VimSmart claimed to have successfully developed 5G network equipment in half a year. Vietnam Telecom has fully mastered 5G technology and will use domestic equipment to popularize 5G networks by 2022.

5G is a high-tech field that even developed countries like the United States and the United Kingdom are concerned about insufficient competitiveness. Even some public opinions that are more optimistic about the development of India and Vietnam are still puzzled about the “Great Leap Forward” of 5G technology in the two countries. Some sources believe that the so-called “independent research and development” and “100% domestically produced” 5G systems of the two countries actually purchase core components and systems from companies such as Nokia and Ericsson, and then carry out some “independent” packaging. The so-called 5G mobile phone is only that the mobile phone is equipped with Qualcomm’s 5G chip. Because there are “public models” provided by professional companies, the threshold for mobile phone integration is not high.

Even if it is easy to be seen by people in the industry, India and Vietnam are willing to package “domestic” high-tech products, and we are not unfamiliar with the emotional motivation behind them. It is understandable that emerging countries have expectations for their own future development and have a keen interest in technological independence. The national public opinion will also respond positively to the progress made in its own science and technology, even if the standard is lower, it is the first step to fill the gap in localization. Sometimes, in order to form a stronger resonance with domestic emotions, it is exaggerated to claim that it is “100% domestically made” and “completely autonomous”. It is not necessary for people from all walks of life to be too true to this kind of eye-catching marketing. It can be expected that with the strengthening of external anti-globalization trends and the rise of internal national sentiment, countries around the world may increasingly emphasize “independent products” and “independent industrial chains”, and “domestic” high-tech phenomena will appear more and more.

What does this trend mean for multinational companies that truly master the key technologies of the industrial chain? At present, China also has a considerable number of companies deep in the global industrial chain. In the face of the “localization” demand of various countries, how should we choose?

For the industry, the core point is still to meet customer needs as much as possible, such as splitting the originally complete product into parts and providing solutions to help customers achieve “domestic production” as easily as possible. Some countries may raise “localization” into law and impose rigid requirements on the upper limit of the value of imported components. Enterprises need to further dismantle the components and realize greater added value when assembling the components locally to meet local value creation requirements.

The level of development of India and Vietnam is at the forefront of the developing countries, and can really add some local production elements to the “localization” process. At least R&D personnel have the ability to understand the structure and production process of the product, and separate the parts within their own capabilities. Therefore, although India and Vietnam’s propaganda of independent 5G technology is a bit too much, it is by no means nonsense. The reason why India claims that 5G systems can be supplied to the world is to open up the production process. If there are external orders, it is indeed feasible.

On the other hand, the leading companies in the global high-tech industry are embarking on a real technology contest, which is much deeper than the above-mentioned “domestic” packaging. Today’s Chinese public opinion requires a truly “technical content” core technology and components that are not comparable to the past. The localization of these core technologies and components is beyond the capabilities of most developing countries, and even some developed countries cannot do it. Only a few countries with historical accumulation and firm determination are still making arduous technological breakthroughs.

Due to the law of technological development, the technological gap between developed and developing countries is widening. High-tech core technologies and parts are continuously optimized, the division of labor involved in the industry is getting finer, and the tree-like knowledge dependence is getting bigger and bigger. If developing countries do not make up their minds to participate as soon as possible, the road behind will only be more difficult.

Under this circumstance, companies in the industry have already given “easy” localization compromises, and India and Vietnam have also given their choices, not to smash the difficult core technology and component research and development, this is a consideration. A rational choice based on national conditions is also a “win-win” solution that the industry is willing to see. If the operation is mature, some countries may think that this is already “localization”. As for the parts that cannot be produced in the country, it is equivalent to importing natural resources from foreign countries, and there is no need to impose requirements.

For China, this choice is twofold. On the one hand, Chinese companies with technological advantages must serve their customers well when facing the “domestic” demand in the global market. On the other hand, China also needs to be wary of this “easy” localization of systemic impact on the real localization of core technologies and parts.

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